Vom Kriege () is a book on war and military strategy by general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife Marie von Brühl in 1832.
Vom Kriege has been translated into English several times as On War. On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.
His ten-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussia. On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations.
History
Clausewitz was among those intrigued by the manner in which the leaders of the French Revolution, especially
Napoleon, changed the conduct of war through their ability to motivate the populace and gain access to the full resources of the state, thus unleashing war on a greater scale than had previously been seen in Europe. Clausewitz believed that moral forces in battle had a significant influence on its outcome. Clausewitz was well-educated and had strong interests in art, history, science, and education. He was a professional soldier who spent a considerable part of his life fighting against Napoleon. In his lifetime, he had experienced both the French Revolutionary Army's (1792—1802) zeal and the conscripted armies employed by the French crown. The insights he gained from his political and military experiences, combined with a solid grasp of European history, provided the basis for his work.
A wealth of historical examples is used to illustrate its various ideas. Napoleon and Frederick the Great figure prominently for having made very efficient use of the terrain, movement and the forces at their disposal.
Regarding Clausewitz’s intellectual-cultural background, Azar Gat argues that he expressed in the field of military theory the main themes of the Romanticism reaction against the worldview of the Enlightenment, rejecting universal principles and stressing historical diversity and the forces of the human spirit. This explains the strength and value of many of his arguments, derived from this great cultural movement, but also his often harsh rhetoric against his predecessors.
Clausewitz's theory
Definition of war
Clausewitz argued that war theory cannot be a strict operational advice for generals.
[G.H.L. LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare" History Today (Aug 1951), Vol. 1 Issue 8, pp 24-32.] Instead, he wanted to highlight general principles that would result from the study of history and logical thinking. He contended that military campaigns could be planned only to a very small degree because incalculable influences or events, so-called
friction, would quickly make any too-detailed planning in advance obsolete. Military leaders must be capable to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information since in his opinion "three quarters of the things on which action is built in war" are concealed and distorted by the
fog of war.
In his 1812 Bekenntnisschrift ("Notes of Confession"), he presents a more existential interpretation of war by envisioning war as the highest form of self-assertion by a people. That corresponded in every respect with the spirit of the time when the French Revolution and the conflicts that arose from it had caused the evolution of conscript armies and guerrillas. The people's armies supported the idea that war is an existential struggle.
During the following years, however, Clausewitz gradually abandoned this exalted view and concluded that the war served as a mere instrument: "Thus, war is an act of violence in order to force our will upon the enemy."
Purpose, goal and means
Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along the line of the categories
Purpose,
Goal and
Means. He reasoned that the
Purpose of war is one's will to be enforced, which is determined by politics. The
Goal of the conflict is therefore to defeat the opponent in order to exact the
Purpose. The
Goal is pursued with the help of a strategy, that might be brought about by various
Means such as by the defeat or the elimination of opposing armed forces or by non-military
Means (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve as
Means to achieve the set goal.
[LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare"]
One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes summarizes that idea: "War is the continuation of policy with other means."
That quote in itself allows for the interpretation that the military will take over from politics as soon as war has begun (as, for example, the German General Staff did during World War I). However, Clausewitz had postulated the primacy of politics and in this context elaborated: "..., we claim that war is nothing more than a continuation of the political process by applying other means. By applying other means we simultaneously assert that the political process does not end with the conclusion of the war or is being transformed into something entirely different, but that it continues to exist and proceed in its essence, regardless of the structure of the means it makes use of ...."
According to Azar Gat, the "general message" of the book was that "the conduct of war could not be reduced to universal principles and dominated by political decisions and moral forces."
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War must never be seen as having any purpose in itself but should be seen as a political instrument: "War is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of the political process, an application by other means."
[ On War, Book I, Chapter 1, 24., Carl von Clausewitz, translated by J.J. Graham, p. 18 ]
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The military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm" the enemy: "to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent."
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All else being equal, the course of war will tend to favor the party with the stronger emotional and political motivations, especially the defender.
Some of the key ideas (not necessarily original to Clausewitz or even to his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst) discussed in On War include[This list is from " Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz," ClausewitzStudies.org, edited by Christopher Bassford.] (in no particular order of importance):
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the dialectic to military analysis
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the methods of "critical analysis"
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the uses and abuses of historical studies
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the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
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the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
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the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
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the nature of " military genius" () - as exemplified particularly in Frederick the Great and in Napoleon Bonaparte
[
]
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the "fascinating trinity" (Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) of war
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philosophical distinctions between "absolute or ideal war," and "real war"
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in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited war and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
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"war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm, rather than to the realms of art or science
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"strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
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"tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
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the essential unpredictability of war
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simplicity: Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate.
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the "fog of war"
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"friction"
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strategic and operational "centres of gravity"
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the "culminating point of the offensive"
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the "culminating point of victory"
Influence and conflicting interpretations
Modern perceptions of war are based on the concepts that Clausewitz put forth in
On War, but they have been diversely interpreted by various leaders (such as Moltke,
Vladimir Lenin, Dwight Eisenhower, and
Mao Zedong), thinkers, armies, and peoples. Modern military doctrine, organization, and norms are all still based on Napoleonic premises, but whether the premises are necessarily also "Clausewitzian" is debatable.
Some prominent critics have interpreted On War as an argument for "total war". The book has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and the Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable developments that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic era. These developments resulted (though the evolution of war has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times".[Robert Osgood, 1979.]
The "dualism" of Clausewitz's view of war (that wars can vary a great deal between the two "poles" that he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context) seems to be simple enough, but few commentators have been willing to accept that crucial variability. They insist that Clausewitz "really" argued for one end of the scale or the other. Clausewitz's use of a dialectical method to construct his argument, led to frequent modern misinterpretation because he allegedly explores various often-opposed ideas before he came to conclusions.
However, according to Gat, the opposing interpretations of Clausewitz are rooted in Clausewitz’s own conceptual journey.[ On War, IV, 3, pp. 228-229; III, 9, p. 198; III, 10, p. 202.] and argued that defense was legitimate only if and as long as one was weaker than the enemy.[ On War, VI, 1, 2, pp. 358-359; VI, 8, p. 380, and VII, 2, p. 524.] Nevertheless, in the last years of his life, after the first six out of the eight books of On War had already been drafted, Clausewitz came to recognize that this concept was not universal and did not even apply to the Napoleonic Wars, the supreme model of his theory of war. This was demonstrated by the Peninsular War and Russian campaigns and by guerrilla warfare, in all of which battle was systematically avoided. Consequently, from 1827 on, Clausewitz recognized the legitimacy of limited war and explained it by the influence of politics that harnessed the unlimited nature of war to serve its objectives. Clausewitz died in 1831 before he completed the revision he planned along these lines. He incorporated his new ideas only into the end of Book VI, Book VIII and the beginning of Book I of On War. As a result, when published, On War encompassed both his old and new ideas, at odds with each other.
Thus, against common interpretations of On War, Gat points out that Clausewitz’s transformed views regarding the relationship between politics and war and the admission of limited war into his theory constituted a U-turn against his own life-long fundamental view of the nature of war. Gat further argues the readers’ miscomprehension of the theory in On War as complete and dialectical, rather than a draft undergoing a radical change of mind, has thus generated a range of reactions. People of each age have found in On War the Clausewitz who suited their own views on war and its conduct. Between 1870 and 1914, he was celebrated mainly for his insistence on the clash of forces and the decisive battle, and his emphasis on moral forces. By contrast, after 1945, during the Atomic Age, his reputation has reached a second pinnacle for his later acceptance of the primacy of politics and the concept of limited war.
Criticism
Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticized by other military theorists, like Antoine-Henri Jomini
in the 19th century, B. H. Liddell Hart
in the mid-20th century, and Martin van Creveld
and
John Keegan more recently.
is a work rooted solely in the world of the
nation state, states historian Martin van Creveld, who alleges that Clausewitz takes the state "almost for granted", as he rarely looks at anything before the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, and mediaeval warfare is effectively ignored in Clausewitz's theory.
[ He alleges that Clausewitz does not address any form of intra/supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state.][
]
Previous kinds of conflict were demoted to criminal activities without legitimacy and not worthy of the label "war". Van Creveld argues that "Clausewitzian war" requires the state to act in conjunction with the people and the army, the state becoming a massive engine built to exert military force against an identical opponent. He supports that statement by pointing to the conventional armies in existence throughout the 20th century. However, revolutionaries like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels derived some inspiration from Clausewitzian ideas.
Referring to much of the current interpretation of On War as the Emperor’s New Clothes syndrome, Gat argues that instead of critically addressing the puzzling contradictions in On War, Clausewitz has been set in stone and could not be wrong.
English translations
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1873. Graham, J.J. translator. Republished 1908 with extensive commentary and notes by Victorian era imperialist F.N. Maude.
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1943. O. J. Matthijs Jolles, translator (New York: Random House, 1943). This is viewed by some modern scholars as the most accurate existing English translation.
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1968. Edited with introduction by Anatol Rapoport. Viking Penguin. .
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1976/1984. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators. Princeton University Press. .
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1989. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators. Princeton University Press. .
See also
Concepts
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List of military theorists
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Philosophy of war
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Realpolitik
Books
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Achtung - Panzer! by Heinz Guderian
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Anabasis and Hellenica by Xenophon
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The Art of War by Niccolò Machiavelli
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Commentarii de Bello Gallico by Gaius Julius Caesar
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Epitoma rei militaris by Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus
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Infanterie Greift An by Erwin Rommel
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Mes Rêveries by Maurice de Saxel
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Storm of Steel by Ernst Jünger
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Strategikon of Maurice by Byzantine Emperor Maurice
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Tactica of Emperor Leo VI the Wise
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Truppenführung by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
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The Utility of Force by General Rupert Smith
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The Influence of Sea Power upon History by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan
Notes
- a. : For example, writing in his introduction to Sun Tzu's Art of War, B. H. Liddell Hart stated that "Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars of this century if the influence of Clausewitz's monumental tome On War, which molded European military thought in the era preceding the First World War, had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu's exposition on The Art of War." This comment is tempered by the comment that the "ill-effects of Clausewitz's teaching arose largely from his disciples' too shallow and too extreme interpretation of it," but it remains an influential criticism. Extracted from The Art of War
/dd>
Bibliography
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Bassford, Christopher, 1994. Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America. Oxford University Press.
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Bernard Brodie, 1976. A guide to the reading of "On War." Princeton University Press.
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Clausewitz, Carl von (2018). Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
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Clausewitz, Carl von (2020). Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 1. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
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Clausewitz, Carl von (2021). The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 2. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
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Gat, Azar (2001). A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Oxford (GB): Oxford University Press. .
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Gat, Azar (2024). The Clausewitz myth: or the emperor's new clothes. Washington: John Hunt Publishing. .
Further reading
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Bassford, Christopher, 2002. " Clausewitz and His Works." Describes the author's intent, and discusses interpretations and common misunderstandings.
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Coker, Christopher. Rebooting Clausewitz: 'On War' in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford University Press, 2017) online review.
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Cormier, Youri. War as paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on fighting doctrines and ethics (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2016).
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Daase, Christopher, and James W. Davis (eds). Clausewitz on Small War (2015) online review
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Erfourth M. & Bazin, A. (2014). Clausewitz’s Military Genius and the #Human Dimension. The Bridge.
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Hughes, R. Gerald. "Clausewitz, still the Master of War?: On Strategy in the Twenty-first Century." War in History 26.2 (2019): 287-296 .
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Kornberger, Martin, and Anders Engberg-Pedersen. "Reading Clausewitz, reimagining the practice of strategy." Strategic Organization (2019): online
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LeMay, G.H.L. "Napoleonic Warfare" History Today (Aug 1951), Vol. 1 Issue 8, pp 24–32.
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Simpson, Emile. "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict." Parameters 47.4 (2017): 7-18.
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Stoker, Donald J. Clausewitz: His Life and Work (Oxford UP, 2014) 376 pp. online review; also excerpt
External links
External links
